

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chapter 17: In Dubious Battle: Vietnam, 1961-1967

Chapter 18: The Lost War: Vietnam, 1968-1975

An investigation of the causes and course of the American involvement in Vietnam should start with several key studies: Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (Oxford University Press, 1978); Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Brookings Institution, 1979); Dave R. Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective* (Presidio, 1978); James Pinkney Harrison, *The Endless War: Fifty Years of Struggle in Vietnam* (Free Press, 1982); Frances FitzGerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam* (Little, Brown, 1972); and Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam* (Viking, 1983); and George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (McGraw-Hill, 2002), now in its fourth edition.

Among the essential works on the Vietnam War and the character of the region are three works by the late Bernard Fall, who died in the war himself: *The Two Viet-Nams*, rev. ed. (Praeger, 1964); *Vietnam Witness, 1953-1966* (Praeger, 1966); and *Last Reflections on a War* (Doubleday, 1967). Other important works on the history of Vietnam are Joseph T. Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled* (2 vols., Praeger, 1967); John T. McAlister, Jr., and Paul Mus, *The Vietnamese and Their Revolution* (Harper & Row, 1970); and Gerald Hickey, *Village in Vietnam* (Yale University Press, 1964). On the origins of the renewal of the Vietnam War, see Jean Sainteny, *Ho Chi Minh and His Revolution* (Cowles, 1972); Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong* (MIT Press, 1966); William J. Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Westview, 1981); Dennis J. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam* (Oxford University Press, 1982); and Robert F. Turner, *Vietnamese Communism* (Hoover Institution Press, 1975).

The origins of the American intervention and escalation can be studied in Chester Cooper, *The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam*, (Dodd, Mead, 1970); Daniel Ellsberg, *Papers on the War* (Simon & Schuster, 1972); David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (Random House, 1972); Herbert Y. Schandler, *The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam* (Princeton University Press, 1977); and Larry Berman, *Planning a Tragedy* (Norton, 1982). "The Pentagon Papers," the internal study commissioned by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1967, appeared in several versions; the most complete is Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967* (16 vols., Government Printing Office, 1971), but another version, *The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition* (5 vols., Beacon Press, 1971-1972), may be more accessible. Key personal perspectives may be found in Lyndon Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (Holt, 1971); Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (Harper, 1976); Walt W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power* (Macmillan, 1972); and Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (Norton, 1972).

The relationship of politics and diplomacy is investigated in Allan E. Goodman, *The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War* (Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Robert L. Gallucci, *Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Viet-Nam* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975); and Garet Porter, *A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement* (Indiana University, 1976).

The critical final six years of the Vietnam War have not yet received adequate scholarly attention, so the reader should see (cautiously) Richard M. Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (Grosset, 1978), and Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Little, Brown, 1978), and *Years of Upheaval* (Little, Brown, 1982). See also P. Edward Haley, *Congress and the Fall of Vietnam and Cambodia* (Associated University Presses, 1982).

For retrospective analyses of the war, see especially W Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., *The Lessons of Vietnam* (Crane, Russak, 1977); Anthony Lake, ed., *The Vietnam Legacy: The War, American Society, and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (Newark University Press, 1976); and Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Presidio, 1982).

The domestic dimension of the Vietnam War and its effects on American society and politics are covered most comprehensively in William O'Neill, *Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 1960's* (Quadrangle, 1971); Alexander Kendrick, *The Wound Within: America in the Vietnam Years, 1945-1974* (Little, Brown, 1974); and Thomas Powers, *The War at Home: Vietnam and the American People, 1964-1968* (Grossman, 1973). The special problems of raising and demobilizing the armed forces are investigated in Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation* (Random House, 1978); John Helmer, *Bringing the War Home: The American Soldier in Vietnam and After* (Free Press, 1974); and Robert Jay Lifton, *Home from the War—Vietnam Veterans: Neither Victims Nor Executioners* (Simon & Schuster, 1973).

The American conduct of the war in Vietnam has already received extensive analysis, although the publication of the official histories by the armed forces has barely begun. A good introduction is Ray Bonds, ed., *The Vietnam War* (Crown, 1979), an illustrated collection of essays written largely by professional military historians. For the conduct of the war during the American buildup period, see William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Doubleday, 1976). Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers* (University Press of New England, 1977), investigates the views of the Army's senior field commanders, while Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *The American Enlisted Man* (Russell Sage, 1970), and Charles B. Flood, *The War of the Innocents* (McGraw-

Hill, 1970), examine the troops' perspective. The Department of the Army has published a series of "Vietnam Studies" written by the senior field commanders that describe a variety of combat and combat-related subjects. The Navy studies to date cover the advisory period to 1959, logistics, and riverine warfare. The Marine Corps historical division has published three volumes on the Marines' role through 1966 as well as a special studies on small-unit actions and the battle for Khe Sanh. For III MAF operations, see also History and Museums Division, HQMC, *The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973* (HQMC, 1974), a series of reports written by Brig. Gen. E. H. Simmons, USMC (Ret.), supplemented by a bibliography and other topical essays, as well as Lewis W. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy* (Funk & Wagnalls, 1970). In addition, the Coast Guard has published a study of its Vietnam Service.

The literature on the air war is large and varied in perspective: Air War Study Group, Cornell University, *The Air War in Indochina*, rev. ed. (Beacon, 1972); U.S.G. Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat* (Presidio, 1978); William W. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars* (HQ, USAF, 1978); Frank Harvey, *Air War-Vietnam* (Bantam, 1967); Jack Broughton, *Thud Ridge* (Lippincott, 1969); and various Air Force authors with introduction by Drew Middleton, *Air War-Vietnam* (Arno, 1978). The Air Force historical division has thus far also published special studies on the use of herbicides, air rescue operations, the use of fixed-wing gunships, airlift, air base defense, the battle for Khe Sanh, the evacuation of Saigon, and specific air operations against North Vietnam. For the experience of American POWs, most of whom were airmen, see John G. Hubbell et al., *P.O.W: A Definitive History of the American Prisoner of War Experience in Vietnam, 1964-1973* (Reader's Digest Press, 1976), as well as the personal memoirs of individual POWs.

The frustrations and complexities of "the other war" of nation building and pacification are examined at the policy level in Sir Robert Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam* (McKay, 1969), and *Peace Is Not at Hand* (Chatto and Windus, 1974), as well as Robert Shaplen, *The Lost Revolution: The U.S. in Vietnam, 1946-1966* (Harper, 1966), and *The Road from War: Vietnam, 1965-1970* (Harper, 1970). George K. Tanham, *War Without Guns: American Civilians in Rural Vietnam* (Praeger, 1966), discusses the early aid effort. On CORDS, see Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints upon U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam* (RAND, 1972). Among the most significant studies of the local war against the VC are William R. Corson, *The Betrayal* (Norton, 1968); F. J. West, Jr., *The Village* (Harper, 1972); Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An* (University of California Press, 1971); and Stuart A. Herrington, *Silence Was a Weapon* (Presidio, 1982).

The final collapse of South Vietnam has also produced its share of accounts from both the victors and vanquished: William E. Le Gro, *Vietnam from Cease-Tire to Capitulation* (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981); Wilford Burchett, *Grasshoppers and Elephants: Why Vietnam Tell* (Urizen Books, 1977); Van Tien Dung, *Our Great Spring Victory* (Monthly Review Press, 1977); Nguyen Van Ky, *Twenty Years and Twenty Days* (Stein & Day, 1976); Tran Van Don, *Our Endless War* (Presidio, 1978); Arnold R. Isaacs, *Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); and Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen, and Brian Jenkins, *The Fall of South Vietnam* (RAND, 1978).

For accounts of some of the war's most dramatic events, see Eugene G. Windchy, *Tonkin Gulf* (Doubleday, 1971); Seymour Hersh, *My Lai 4* (Random House, 1970); Don Oberdorfer, *TET!* (Doubleday, 1971); Peter Braestrup, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington* (2 vols., Westview,

1977); and Benjamin F. Schemmer, *The Raid* (Harper, 1976), on the Son Tay rescue attempt. The late Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall, USAR, also wrote five books on Vietnam combat operations, using the after-action interviewing methods he pioneered in World War II and Korea.

Of the many important articles on the Vietnam War, see especially King C. Chen, "Hanoi's Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War," *Political Science Quarterly* 90 (Summer 1975), 239-259; Richard C. Thornton, "Soviet Strategy and the Vietnam War," *Asian Affairs* 4 (March-April 1974), 205-228; Herman L. Gilster, "Air Interdiction in Protracted War," *Air University Review* 27 (May-June 1977), 3-18; and W Hays Parks, "Rolling Thunder and the Law of War," *Air University Review* 33 (January-February 1982), 2-23; and "Linebacker and the Law of War," *Air University Review* 34 (January-February 1983), 2-30.

The best way to follow the course of American national security policy during the Vietnam era is to consult the annual *Strategic Survey* for 1965-1975, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, a London-based organization for defense analysis. See also Lawrence J. Korb, *The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon* (Greenwood, 1979); Harland B. Moulton, *From Superiority to Parity: The United States and the Strategic Arms Race, 1961-1971* (Greenwood, 1973); Thomas W Wolfe, *The SALT Experience* (Ballinger, 1979); John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973); John M. Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960-1980* (McGraw-Hill , 1980); Adam Yarmolinsky, *The Military Establishment* (Harper & Row, 1971); Alton Frye, *A Responsible Congress* (McGraw-Hill, 1975); Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal *The All-Volunteer Force* (University of Michigan Press, 1977); Office of the Comptroller, Department of Defense, *The Economics of Defense Spending* (Government Printing Office,

1972); and The Staff of *Congressional Quarterly*, *The Power of the Pentagon* (Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1972).

Of the books that attempt to catch the war in its international and national context, see especially Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson, USA (Ret.), *Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975* (Presidio Press, 1985); Timothy J. Lomperis, *The War Everyone Lost—and Won*, (rev. ed., CQ Press, 1993); Larry Cable, *Unholy Grail: The U.S. and the Wars in Vietnam, 1965-68* (Routledge, 1991); David L. Anderson, ed., *Shadow on the White House, Presidents of the Vietnam War, 1945-1975* (University Press of Kansas, 1993); Ronald H. Spector, *After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam* (The Free Press, 1993); Gen. Bruce Palmer, *The 25-Year War* (University Press of Kentucky, 1984); and Larry Berman, *Lyndon Johnson's War* (Norton, 1989). To see the war through the eyes of key American participants, consult Douglas Kinnard, *The Certain Trumpet: Maxwell Taylor and the American Experience in Vietnam* (Brassey's, 1991); William Colby, *Lost Victory* (Contemporary Books, 1989), the memoir of the chief of pacification and former director of the CIA; Cecil B. Currey, *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American* (Houghton Mifflin, 1988) and Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (Random House, 1988).

The operational experience of the U.S. armed forces is described in many able studies. For the role of the Navy, see Cmdr. R. L. Schreadley, *From the Rivers to the Seas: The U.S. Navy in Vietnam* (Naval Institute Press, 1992) and Lt. Comdr. Thomas J. Cutler, *Brown Water, Black Berets* (Naval Institute Press, 1988), which deals with riverine operations and advising the Vietnamese Navy. Still a matter of debate regarding its effectiveness and its morality, the air war receives expert and critical examination in Maj. Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam* (Free Press, 1989); Earl H. Tilford, Jr., *Setup—What the*

Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Air University Press, 1991); Col. John Schlight, *The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965-1968* (Office of Air Force History, 1989); Donald J. Mrozek, *Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam* (Brassey's, 1989); and John B. Nichols and Barrett Tillman, *On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War over Vietnam* (Office of Naval History, 1987). For the varied experience of the Army, see Maj. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Jeffrey J. Clarke, *The U.S. Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support, The Final Years, 1965-1973* (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988); J. D. Coleman, *Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam* (St. Martin's Press, 1988); Shelby L. Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956-1975* (Presidio, 1985) and *Anatomy of a Division: 1st Cav in Vietnam* (Presidio, 1987); Eric M. Bergerud, *Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning: The World of a Combat Division in Vietnam [25th Infantry Division]* (Westview Press, 1993); and Christian G. Appy, *Working-Class Soldiers War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (University of North Carolina Press, 1993).

For a riveting account of ground combat, see Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, *We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young* [battle of Ia Drang Valley] (Random House, 1992) as well as the many works of Eric Hammel and Keith William Nolan, who write about both the Marine Corps and the Army, exploiting oral history and unit records. Part memoir, part history, Col. G. H. Turley, *The Easter Offensive* (Presidio, 1985), describes the role of Marine and Army advisors in defeating the Communist offensive of 1972. An oft-told tale is told again and quite well in John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, *Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh* (Houghton Mifflin, 1991). An important book on the American conduct of the war is Lt. Col. Gary D. Solis, *Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial by Fire* (Headquarters Marine Corps,

1989), while William M. Hammond, *The U.S. Army in Vietnam: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968* (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988) tells of other vicious battles that shaped the war.

The "other war" of counterinsurgency and "the other side of the war," as the Vietnamese Communists viewed the struggle, may be sampled in Truong Nhu Tang, *A Viet Cong Memoir* (Vintage Books, 1986); Michael E. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam* (Praeger, 1989); Dale Andrade, *Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War* (Lexington Books, 1990); David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai, *Portrait of the Enemy* (Random House, 1986), a collection of interviews with members of the PAVN and National Liberation Front; Douglas Pike, *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam* (Presidio, 1986); Thomas C. Thayer, *War Without Fronts* (Westview Press, 1985) and *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance* (Westview Press, 1987). For an important book on the Diem period, see Ellen J. Hammer, *A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963* (Dutton, 1987). Invaluable guides to the study of the war are James S. Olson, ed., *The Vietnam War: Handbook of the Literature and Research* (Greenwood Press, 1993) and Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *Vietnam War Almanac* (Facts on File Publications, 1985).

The turmoil of the American home front is examined in Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up? American Protest Against the War in Vietnam, 1963-1975* (Doubleday, 1984); Kathleen Turner, *Lyndon Johnson's Dual War: Vietnam and the Press* (University of Chicago Press, 1985); Melvin Small, *Johnson, Nixon and the Doves* (Rutgers University Press, 1988); and Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Indiana University Press, 1990).

The literature about the Vietnam War in the years since the publication of the 1994 revised and expanded edition is vast and rich. Surveys that put the war in its national and international context include Robert D. Schulzinger, *A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975* (Oxford University Press, 1997); Jeffrey Record, *The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam* (Naval Institute Press, 1998); Gerard J. DeGroot, *A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War* (Longman, 2000); Mitchell K. Hall, *The Vietnam War* (2nd ed., Longman, 2008); Charles E. Neu, *America's Lost War: Vietnam: 1945-1975* (Harlan Davidson, 2005); James S. Olson and Randy Roberts, *Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-1995* (5th ed., Wiley-Blackwell, 2008); Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History* (Oxford University Press, 2008); Mark Philip Bradley, *Vietnam at War* (Oxford, 2009); George Donelson Moss, *Vietnam: An American Ordeal* (6th ed., Prentice Hall, 2010); and John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975* (University Press of Kansas, 2009). For first-hand accounts from many different perspectives, see Christian G. Appy, ed., *Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides* (Viking, 2003).

The history of the war has become quite controversial, with the foremost division being between “orthodox” and “revisionist” scholars. To varying degrees orthodox historians and believe the war was misguided from the start, that South Vietnam was never vital to American security, and that the U.S. lost the war in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, revisionists consider the war a noble cause to contain Communism. They also assert that after 1969-1971 U.S. had actually defeated the Communists, but self-inflicted wounds from antiwar journalists and protesters and spineless politicians on the home front snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. A discussion of some of the key disputes can be found in Gary R. Hess, *Vietnam: Explaining America's Lost War* (Blackwell, 2009) and Andrew Wiest and Michael J. Doidge,

eds., *Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War* (Routledge, 2010). Three of the foremost revisionist studies are Mark Moyar, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965* (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Lewis Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (Harcourt Brace, 1999); and Michael Lind, *Vietnam: The Necessary War* (Simon & Schuster, 1999).

Leading wartime personalities continue to attract scholarly attention. One of the most fascinating was Ho Chi Minh, whose early efforts to cooperate with the U.S. are the subject for Dixee Bartholomew-Feis's *The OSS and Ho Chi Minh: Unexpected Allies in the War Against Japan* (University Press of Kansas, 2006). William J. Duiker's *Ho Chi Minh: A Life* (Hyperion, 2000) is a full-fledged biography. Seth Jacobs, *Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950-1963* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) is a study of that enigmatic South Vietnamese president. Several books, none of them convincing, have argued that President Kennedy would have ended the war had he lived; for an example, see Howard Jones, *Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War* (Oxford University Press, 2003). On President Johnson, see Robert Dallek, *Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973* (Oxford University Press, 1998); David M. Barrett, *Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers* (University Press of Kansas, 1993); Frederick Logevall, *Choosing War: The Last Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (University of California Press, 1999); Michael H. Hunt, *Lyndon Johnson's War: America's Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968* (Hill and Wang 1996); George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War* (University of Texas Press, 1994); and Walter LaFeber, *The Deadly Bet: LBJ, Vietnam, and the 1968 Election* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). Lewis Sorley detailed the lives of *Westmoreland: The General Who Lost*

Vietnam (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011) and his successor *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Time* (Simon & Schuster, 1992). Robert Dallek's *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (HarperCollins, 2007) is a carefully constructed dual biography of the two men who finally extricated America from the war. On the Nixon administration's war policies, also see the detailed accounts by Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (University Press of Kansas, 1998) and Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam* (Free Press, 2001).

The Secretaries of Defense who served during Vietnam dealt with many problems in addition to the war, such as the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic, the elusive goal of arms control, whether or not to build an ABM system, readjusting NATO to changing circumstances, and a series of crises in the Middle East. See Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. V: The McNamara Ascendancy* (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006) and Edward J. Drea, *Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, Vol. VI, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969* (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011).

An important aspect of the war was the civil-military conflict that prevailed at the highest levels; see Robert Buzzanco, *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era* (Cambridge University Press, 1996) and H. R. McMasters, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (HarperCollins, 1997).

The understanding of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts has benefited from several studies, including Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976* (Center of Military History, 2006) and Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., *Vietnam*

Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency (University Press of Kentucky, 2010). Two splendid studies that detail American ground operations during the war's first three years are John M. Carland, *United States Army in Vietnam: Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide: May 1965 to October 1966* (Center of Military History, 2000) and George L. MacGarrigle, *United States Army in Vietnam: Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive: October 1966 to October 1967* (Center of Military History, 1998). Studies of the war's most crucial event include David F. Schmitz, *The Tet Offensive: Politics, War, and Public Opinion* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) and Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head, eds. *The Tet Offensive* (Praeger, 1996).

An outpouring of monographs has tackled individual battles and campaigns, among them being Keith W. Nolan's multiple publications: *The Magnificent Bastards: The Joint Army-Marine Defense of Dong Ha, 1968* (Presidio Press, 1994); *Sappers in the Wire: The Life and Death of Firebase Mary Ann* (Texas A&M University Press, 1995); *Ripcord: Screaming Eagles Under Siege, Vietnam 1970* (Presidio Press, 2000); and *House to House: Playing the Enemy's Game in Saigon, May 1968* (Zenith Press, 2006). Other noteworthy studies include: David M. Toczek, *The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It* (Greenwood, 2001); Edwin E. Moise, *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (University of North Carolina Press, 1996); James P. Coan, *Con Thien: The Hill of Angels* (University of Alabama Press, 2004); Edward F. Murphy, *Semper Fi-Vietnam: From Da Nang to the DMZ: Marine Corps Campaigns, 1965-1975* (Presidio Press, 1997); Edward F. Murphy, *The Hill Fights: The First Battle of Khe Sanh* (Presidio Press, 2003); Charles A. Krohn, *The Lost Battalion: Controversy and Casualties in the Battle of Hue* (Praeger, 1993); George W. Smith, *The Siege of Hue* (Lynne Rienner, 1999); John M. Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America's Vietnam War* (University Press of Kansas, 2005); William J. Shkurti, *Soldiering*

on in a Dying War: The True Story of the Firebase Pace Incidents and the Vietnam Drawdown (University Press of Kansas, 2011); James H. Willbanks, *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War* (University of Kansas Press, 2004), which is the single best account of the Vietnamization era's military aspects; and Stephen P. Randolph, *Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive* (Harvard University Press, 2007) and Dale Andrade, *Trial By Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle* (Hippocrene Books, 1995), which are especially fine histories of the Easter Offensive.

For the wartime experience at the individual level, see James R. Ebert, *A Life in a Year: The American Infantryman in Vietnam, 1965-1972* (Presidio Press, 1993); Kyle Longley, *Grunts: The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam* (M. E. Sharpe, 2008); and Peter Maslowski and Don Winslow *Looking for a Hero: Staff Sergeant Joe Ronnie Hooper and the Vietnam War* (University of Nebraska Press, 2004). The latter book wraps a history of the war around the life of the man who was often acclaimed as Vietnam's most highly decorated soldier; some of the material used in these two Vietnam chapters comes from this book. Although relatively brief, James E. Westheider's *The African American Experience in Vietnam: Brothers in Arms* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007) is based on the most recent research. A majority of servicemen were either draftees or draft-inspired volunteers, so George Q. Flynn's *The Draft, 1940-1973* (University Press of Kansas, 1993) is an important monograph. The vast majority of those who served in Vietnam did not engage in combat, and Meredith H. Lair, *Armed with Abundance: Consumerism and Soldiering in the Vietnam War* (University of North Carolina Press, 2011) provides a fascinating glimpse of their war.

In all their varied aspects, the air and naval wars continue to be the subject of excellent scholarly works. For the air war, see Bernard C. Nalty, *Air War over South Vietnam, 1968-1975*

(Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000); Wayne Thompson, *To Hanoi and Back: The United States Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-1963* (Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000); Timothy N. Castle, *One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North Vietnam* (Columbia University Press, 1999); and Ronald B. Frankum, Jr., *Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964-1975* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). For the naval war, see Frank Uhlig, Jr., ed., *Vietnam: The Naval War* (Naval Institute Press, 1986); Edward J. Marolda, *The U.S. Navy in the Vietnam War: An Illustrated History* (Potomac Books, 2003); and Carol Reardon, *Launch the Intruders: A Naval Attack Squadron in the Vietnam War, 1972* (University Press of Kansas, 2005).

The least understood military forces that participated in the war were those of South Vietnam. Several books shed light on the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN); see Robert K. Brigham, *ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army* (University Press of Kansas, 2006); Andrew Wiest, *Vietnam's Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN* (2nd ed., New York University Press, 2007); and Lewis Sorley, ed., *The Vietnam War: An Assessment by South Vietnamese Generals* (Texas Tech University Press, 2010). One of the least known aspects of the war was the effort to infiltrate South Vietnamese commandos into North Vietnam; Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andrade, *Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam* (University Press of Kansas, 2000) explain how all the commandos were killed or captured, and how some of the latter became double agents working for North Vietnam.

For an accounts of the war from the enemy's perspective, see William J. Duiker, *Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam* (McGraw-Hill, 1994) and The Military History Institute of Vietnam, translated by Merle E. Pribbenow, *Victory in Vietnam: The*

Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975 (University Press of Kansas, 2002). Marc Jason Gilbert, ed., provides further insight into *Why the North Won the Vietnam War* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). Another important study in understanding how the North prevailed is John Prados, *The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War* (John Wiley, 1999), which recounts how the Communists built and defended that indispensable lifeline to the South. Although not especially cogent, Sandra C. Taylor's *Vietnamese Women at War: Fighting for Ho Chi Minh and the Revolution* (University Press of Kansas, 1999) is virtually the only book on the role women played in the war.

Richard A. Hunt's *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Westview, 1995) is the best book on the subject. A number of studies reveal how pacification failed at the local level, but none are better and more thorough than David W. P. Elliott, *The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975* (2 vols., M. E. Sharpe, 2002) and Eric M. Bergerud, *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province* (Westview Press, 1991).

For the Chinese and Soviet participation in the war, see Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000) and Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Ivan R. Dee, 1996). American's NATO allies were often as unhappy with the U.S. as the Chinese and Soviets were, as Eugenie M. Blang, *Allies at Odds: America, Europe, and Vietnam, 1961-1968* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011) explains.

On the unfortunate subject of war crimes and other misdeeds, see Deborah Nelson, *The War Behind Me: Vietnam Veterans Confront the Truth About U.S. War Crimes* (Basic Books, 2008); William Thomas Allison, *Military Justice in Vietnam: The Rule of Law in an American War* (University Press of Kansas, 2007); Gary D. Solis, *Son Thang: An American War Crime*

(Naval Institute Press, 1997); Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim, *Four Hours in My Lai* (Viking Penguin, 1992); and David L. Anderson, ed., *Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre* (University Press of Kansas, 1998).

A number of informative works have described the American home front, including Tom Wells, *The War Within: America's Battle over Vietnam* (University of California Press, 1994); Walter L. Hixon, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (St. Martin's, 1997); Mitchell K. Hall, *Crossroads: American Popular Culture and the Vietnam Generation* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Mark Hamilton Lytle, *America's Uncivil Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to the Fall of Richard Nixon* (Oxford University Press, 2006); Melvin Small, *Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds* (Scholarly Resources, 2002); and James W. Tollefson, *The Strength Not to Fight: Conscientious Objectors of the Vietnam War in Their Own Words* (Brassey's 2000). One particular home front problem for Nixon was veterans who opposed the war, for he could not logically call them bums, derelicts, and cowards the way he did those protesters who had not served in uniform; see Gerald Nicosia, *Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans' Movement* (Crown, 2001) and Richard Moser, *The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent during the Vietnam Era* (Rutgers University Press, 1996).

The media, often a target of the revisionists, has benefitted from a number of studies that show it reported the war quite accurately, though it did present a negatively biased portrayal of the antiwar movement. Among the best studies are William Prochnau, *Once Upon a Distant War: Young War Correspondents and the Early Vietnam Battles* (Times Books, 1995); William M. Hammond, *The United States Army in Vietnam: Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973* (Center of Military History, 1996); William M. Hammond, *Reporting Vietnam:*

Media and Military at War (University Press of Kansas, 1998); Melvin Small, *Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement* (Rutgers University Press, 1994); and Clarence R. Wyatt, *Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War* (University of Chicago Press, 1993).

The Vietnam War spawned a thick crust of postwar mythology. For various accounts that expose some of the myth-making, see B. G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley, *Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation Was Robbed of Its Heroes and Its History* (Verity Press, 1998); Eric T. Dean, *Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and the Civil War* (Harvard University Press, 1997); Arnold R. Isaacs, *Vietnam Shadows: The War, Its Ghosts, and Its Legacy* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); and Jerry Lembcke, *The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and Its Legacy of Vietnam* (New York University Press, 1998). Hollywood films have done much to distort popular knowledge of the war; see Linda Dittmar and Gene Michaud, *From Hanoi to Hollywood: The Vietnam War in American Film* (Rutgers University Press, 1990).