

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chapter 19: The Common Defense and the End of the Cold War, 1976-1993

The course of American defense policy in the post-Vietnam War era can be charted in several serialized publications. For the international context, see *Strategic Survey* (International Institute of Strategic Studies), an annual publication published by Brassey's USA, and the accompanying reference work, *Military Balance*. Joseph Kruzal, ed., *American Defense Annual* (Lexington Books) by The Ohio State University's Mershon Center, provides essays designed to critique the existing defense plans and budgets. The analysis of the defense budget appeared in a larger annual volume, *Setting National Priorities*, edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Another useful annual publication, *The Defense Program*, sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, has ceased publication. In 1972 the Brookings Institution also started a series of short pamphlets and position papers under the general title *Studies in Defense Policy*, designed to describe which are current governmental policies and offer optional programs.

Defense analysis of the post-Vietnam War era would have been the poorer without the contributions of John M. Collins, a retired Army colonel who became the principal defense expert of the Congressional Research Service. Collins's work can be criticized and revised, but not ignored: *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance* (McGraw-Hill, 1980); *U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique* (Westview Press, 1982); *US.-Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985* (Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985); *Green Berets, SEALS & Spetsnaz: U.S. and Soviet Special Military Operations* (Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986); *Military Space Forces* (Brassey's, 1989); and *America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future* (Brassey's, 1991).

The volatile state of the defense debate in the early 1980s can be sampled in Francis P. Hoerber, William Schneider, Norman Polmar, and Ray Bessette, *Arms, Men, and Military*

Budgets, FY 1981 (Transaction Books, 1980); the Boston Study Group, *The Price of Defense* (Times Books, 1979); and Carnegie Panel of U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, *Challenges of U.S. National Security Policy* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981). As the Reagan administration's rearmament program swept forward, an accurate gauge of the administration's positions was the publications of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, which commissioned group studies of topical issues that then drew the endorsement of former cabinet officers and retired generals and admirals. The ideological counterpart is the Center for Defense Information, which lobbies for nonintervention, a low defense budget, and disarmament, and which has its own publications program.

The Carter administration has not yet received the even-handed treatment it deserves from defense analysts. One early assessment is John L. Moore, et al., *U.S. Defense Policy: Weapons, Strategy and Commitments* (Congressional Quarterly, 1980). Burton I. Kaufman, *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.* (University Press of Kansas, 1993) provides the essential context; for more comprehensive treatment, see Harold Brown, *Thinking About National Security* (Westview Press, 1983) and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981* (rev. ed., Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1985). See also Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., *Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Year* (Westview Press, 1979) and Jeffrey Record, *Revising U.S. Military Strategy* (Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984). The Democratic defense analysts or exiles from Weinberger's Defense Department then used the journal *International Security*, published by the Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard University since 1976, as an outlet for their skepticism about the Reagan administration. The Republicans volleyed back in the journals *Strategic Review*, *Foreign Policy*, and *The National Interest*.

Like the Carter administration, Reagan's Department of Defense used the *Annual Report to Congress* (Government Printing Office) to make its case for its own program, supported by an annual "threat assessment," *Soviet Military Power*, which ceased publication in 1992. Two first-person accounts, neither particularly impressive for policy analysis or personal insight, are Caspar W. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (Warner Books, 1990) and John F. Lehman, Jr., *Command of the Seas* (Scribner's, 1988). The best memoir for national security affairs is George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (Scribner's, 1993). The 1980s defense buildup received an early evaluation in Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., *The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment* (Scholarly Resources, 1986); a mid-term evaluation in William P. Snyder and James Brown, eds., *Defense Policy in the Reagan Administration* (National Defense University, 1988); and full treatment in Daniel Wirls, *Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era* (Cornell University Press, 1992). Studies of special interest that link the Carter and Reagan years are Strobe Talbot, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (Harper & Row, 1979) and *Deadly Gambits* (Knopf, 1985); Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton University Press, 1982); Donald R. Baucom, *The Origins of SDI, 1944-1983* (University Press of Kansas, 1992); Robert Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War* (Vintage Books, 1983); and Herbert Scoville, *MX: Prescription for Disaster* (MIT Press, 1981).

The declaratory policy of the Bush administration may be found in any sample of its official statements such as, for example, The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Government Printing Office, August, 1991); Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy* (The Joint Staff, 1992); and The Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Office of the Secretary of Defense, February, 1992).

Its problems are surveyed in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Richard H. Shultz, eds., *U.S. Defense Policy in an Era of Constrained Resources* (Free Press, 1989). The Bush administration's stewardship is now almost defined by the history of the Gulf War, not by its four-year struggle to save the Reagan buildup. Despite its "kiss-and-tell" taint, a good source is Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (Simon & Schuster, 1991).

For the difficulties of defense procurement and industrial relations, consult Thomas L. McNaugher, *New Weapons, Old Politics: America's Military Procurement Muddle* (Brookings Institution, 1989); J. Ronald Fox and James L. Field, *The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition* (Harvard Business School Press, 1988); Jacques S. Gansler, *Affording Defense* (MIT Press, 1989); Kenneth R. Mayer, *The Political Economy of Defense Contracting* (Yale University Press, 1991); Richard A. Stubbing, *The Defense Game* (Harper & Row, 1986); William H. Gregory, *The Defense Procurement Mess* (Lexington Books, 1989); President's Blue Ribbon Commission (Packard Commission) on Defense Management, *A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President* (Government Printing Office, 1986); Tim Weiner, *Blank Check: The Pentagon's Black Budget* (Warner, 1990); and Fred Hampson, *Unguided Missiles: How America Buys Its Weapons* (Norton, 1990).

The expeditionary, punitive operations of the U.S. armed forces are described in Maj. Daniel P. Bolger, *Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace* (Presidio, 1988) while the most dramatic affairs are treated in greater and critical detail in Maj. (British Army) Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada* (Lexington Books, 1989); Lt. Gen. Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., *Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just Cause* (Brassey's, 1993); and Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Barker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (Lexington Books, 1991). Supplying these sorts of operations is the subject of Edgar F. Raines,

Jr., *The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983* (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2010). For special operations, see Steven Emerson, *Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era* (Putnam, 1988). For a regional account of the tangled web of diplomacy, terrorism, and military intervention, see John K. Cooley, *Payback: America's Long War in the Middle East* (Brassey's, 1991). The agony of the Lebanon intervention is described in Benis M. Frank, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982-1984* (History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1988). The history of Navy operations in the Persian Gulf is described in Michael A. Palmer, *On Course to Desert Storm: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf* (Naval Historical Division, 1992). Ralph A. Hallenbeck, *Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982-February 1984* (Greenwood Press, 1991) condemns the Lebanon intervention, and The Independent Commission of Inquiry on the U.S. Invasion of Panama, *The U.S. Invasion of Panama* (South End Press, 1991) offers an overheated indictment of Operation JUST CAUSE. For the historical context of Latin American policy, 1975-1993, see Robert A. Pastor, *Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Princeton University Press, 1992). For a droll account of the Nicaraguan war, see Glenn Garvin, *Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA & the Contras* (Brassey's, 1993).

The public literature on the Gulf War from the victors' perspective runs the gamut in mood from celebratory to cautionary, in research and analysis from superficial to thoughtful. The Department of Defense summed up its version of the war in *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Government Printing Office, 1991) and the *Defense 91 Almanac* (September/October, 1991) provides useful statistics. Congressional hearings during and after the crisis also provide important views. Then-Representative Les Aspin of the House Armed

Services Committee commissioned several Government Accounting Office studies of selected aspects of the campaign; these reports are best on nonoperational matters like funding, logistics, and management. Aspin and fellow Representative William Dickinson published their views in *Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War* (Brassey's, 1992). Unofficial histories of the war from service perspectives are Richard P. Hallion, *Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War* (Smithsonian Institution, 1992) and Norman Friedman, *Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait* (rev. ed., Naval Institute Press, 1992). The official air war histories are: Diane T. Putney, *Airpower Advantage: Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign, 1989-1991* (Air Force History and Museums Program, 2004); Perry D. Jamieson, *Lucrative Targets: The U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations* (Air Force History and Museums Program, 2001); and Richard G. Davis, *On Target: Organizing and Executing the Strategic Air Campaign Against Iraq* (Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002). The Army has a "lessons learned" history written by a team of officers: Brig. Gen. Robert H. Scales, Jr., director, Desert Storm Study Project, *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War* (Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993). A very critical assessment of U.S. Army leadership is found in Douglas Macgregor, *Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting* (Naval Institute Press, 2009).

There are two autobiographical accounts of the war by Army generals: H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (Bantam, 1992) and William G. Pagonis, *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War* (Harvard Business School Press, 1992). Studies critical of General Schwarzkopf in particular and the Bush administration in general are spreading like an oil slick: Jeffrey Record, *Hollow Victory* (Brassey's, 1993) and Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Gulf War* (Houghton Mifflin, 1993). For the Marine Corps, see History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, *U.S. Marines in*

the Persian Gulf 1990-1991: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Government Printing Office, 1992), which includes articles and interviews by the senior Marine commanders, and Col. Charles J. Quilter II, USMCR, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Government Printing Office, 1993). For an Allied perspective, see 10th Report of the Defense Committee, 1990-1991, House of Commons, *Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby* (HMSO, 1991). Of the many examples of instant punditry and historical interpretation, two are notable for their measured appreciation of the conflict: Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karash, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991* (Princeton University Press, 1993) and Dilip Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm* (Routledge, 1992). Of the breathless school of journalistic coverage, the best is Staff of *U.S. News and World Report*, *Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War* (Times Books, 1992). For a strong personal account of covering the war, see Molly Moore, *A Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines* (Scribner's, 1993).